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Countries that wish to erect trade barriers have a variety of instruments at their disposal.
In addition to tariﬀs and quotas, countries can oﬀer tax relief, low interest ﬁnancing, reduced
regulation, and other subsidies to domestic industries facing foreign competition. In a trade
agreement, countries typically agree to reduce not only tariﬀs, but also subsidies. We con-
sider the eﬀect of a free trade agreement on pollution emissions. We show that while reducing
tariﬀs may indeed increase output and pollution, reductions in some subsides required by
the trade agreement reduce pollution in general equilibrium for reasonable parameter val-
ues. Reducing subsidies has three eﬀects on pollution: (1) reducing subsidies to ﬁrms reduces
pollution-causing capital accumulation, (2) if subsidized ﬁrms are more pollution intensive,
then reducing subsides moves capital and labor from more to less pollution intensive ﬁrms,
and (3) reducing subsidies concentrates production in more productive ﬁrms, increasing out-
put and thus pollution. We derive straightforward conditions for which (1) and (2) outweigh
(3). We then calibrate the model to China in 1997, which is prior to implementing the
reforms speciﬁcally required by the US-China World Trade Organization (WTO) Bilateral
Agreement. Our model predicts that pollution emissions in China are up to 4.9% lower than
a benchmark in which China does not enter the WTO, without any pollution abatement
policy changes or environmental side agreements.1 Introduction
Countries that wish to erect trade barriers have a variety of instruments at their disposal. In
addition to tariﬀs and quotas, countries can oﬀer tax relief, low interest ﬁnancing, reduced
regulation, and other subsidies to domestic industries facing foreign competition. The politi-
cal process is unlikely to produce a uniform tariﬀ. Instead, countries with high trade barriers
employ a complex mixture of all these instruments, resulting in signiﬁcant distortions. In a
trade agreement, countries typically agree to reduce not only tariﬀs, but also subsidies. For
example, subsidies to exporting industries violate WTO rules.1
The main claim of our paper is that reductions in domestic subsidies implied by some
trade agreements have signiﬁcant eﬀects on pollution emissions. These eﬀects are associated
with a country’s opening to trade and, therefore, cannot be ignored when considering the
eﬀects of trade agreements on pollution. The focus of trade agreements and of this paper
is not on benign and well-studied subsidies designed to correct an externality, but instead
on subsidies designed solely to support a particular industry or ﬁrm (typically facing foreign
competition). Such subsidies are sometimes called “perverse subsidies” (for example Myers
and Kent 2001). We show that reducing such subsidies has three eﬀects on pollution. First,
a reduction in subsidies to ﬁrms reduces pollution-causing capital accumulation. Second, if
subsidized ﬁrms, industries, and/or state owned enterprises (SOEs) are more pollution in-
tensive, then reducing subsides moves capital and labor from more to less pollution intensive
ﬁrms. Third, reducing subsidies concentrates capital and labor in more productive ﬁrms,
increasing output and thus pollution. We derive conditions under which the ﬁrst two eﬀects
outweigh the third. In our most conservative calibration, our main condition is satisﬁed for
all three pollutants studied.
Thus even if world tariﬀ reductions cause pollution-intensive production to increase in
a country, overall pollution may still fall because the tariﬀ eﬀect is more than oﬀset by the
reduction in pollution caused by the reduction in subsidies. Indeed, we calibrate the model
to China in 1997 and ﬁnd that, after reducing subsidies required by the WTO agreement, the
equilibrium path of industrial dust emissions in our model converges over time to a steady
state 4.9% lower than a benchmark economy in which no subsidies are reduced. Similarly,
1Speciﬁcally, subsides speciﬁc to an individual or group of ﬁrms, products, or industries which are either
contingent on export performance (“prohibited”) or have adverse eﬀects on member industries (“actionable”)
are not allowed. Member countries may bring suit to have such subsidies removed or be allowed to retaliate.
See Annex 1A, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the WTO’s legal document on the
Uruguay Round Agreements. Bagwell and Staiger (2006) argue the criteria for challenging domestic subsidies
in the WTO is weak enough so that governments can in principle challenge any positive subsidy.
1steady state sulfur dioxide (SO2) is 3.8% lower, and soot is 3.2% lower. The reductions in
pollution occurs without any environmental side agreements or abatement policy changes.
There is a large theoretical literature on trade and the environment.2 Research has
focused on three possible channels whereby a reduction in trade barriers can aﬀect environ-
mental quality. Following Copeland and Taylor (2004) and others, we denote the idea that
a reduction in trade barriers causes pollution intensive production to shift from countries
with relatively stringent regulation to countries with relatively weak regulation the pollution
haven hypothesis (PHH). The PHH predicts that, following a reduction in trade barriers,
pollution rises in the country with weak regulation and falls in the country with stringent
regulation.3 A second channel, the factor endowment hypothesis says that since pollution
is capital intensive, reducing trade barriers should cause pollution intensive industries to
move to the more capital intensive country, usually the more developed country. In the third
channel, increases in income caused by a reduction in trade barriers aﬀects both pollution
intensive production and abatement spending.
Mani and Wheeler (1997), Low and Yeats (1992), Ratnayake (1998), and others ﬁnd
some evidence in favor of the PHH. These studies suﬀer from lack of pollution data in less
developed countries, and so must instead classify industries according to their pollution
intensity in the US and then correlate output in pollution intensive industries to openness.
On the other hand, Birdsall and Wheeler (1992) and Lucas, Wheeler, and Hettige (1992) ﬁnd
that pollution intensity is relatively lower in more open economies. In general, environmental
regulations do not seem to be a major factor in plant location decisions.
As Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) note, both theoretical and empirical studies
generally take pollution regulations and/or income to be exogenous. For example, countries
may tighten environmental regulations after an inﬂow of pollution intensive capital. Even
if pollution regulations are identical across countries, production moves to its most eﬃcient
location, causing production and pollution to increase. The resulting increase in income may
itself cause countries to increase abatement or otherwise tighten pollution regulations, as has
been noted in the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature (Grossman and Krueger
1995). Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) study the eﬀect of reducing trade barriers
on SO2 concentrations. They decompose the eﬀect into scale, composition, and technique
eﬀects. Reducing trade barriers causes output to rise, which increases pollution (the scale
2Survey papers include Copeland and Taylor (2004), Kolstad and Xing (1996), Rauscher (2001), and
Ulph (1997).
3That is, we are not considering the pollution haven eﬀect, which deals with the eﬀect of environmental
regulations on trade ﬂows.
2eﬀect). However, the increase in income also results in increased abatement spending, reduc-
ing pollution (the technique eﬀect). Finally, a reduction in trade frictions causes the country
exporting the dirty good to specialize in that good, increasing pollution (the composition
eﬀect). They also avoid the data problems present in previous studies by using data on
SO2 pollution emissions from the Global Environmental Monitoring database. They ﬁnd a
particularly strong technique eﬀect, implying that trade improves the quality of the environ-
ment by raising income and abatement. This channel has perhaps the best support in the
data. However, the EKC does not seem to be robust to changes in empirical speciﬁcation or
across pollutants (Harbaugh, Levinson, and Wilson 2002, Stern and Common 2001), so the
result may not generalize to pollutants other than SO2.
We propose here an entirely new channel by which free trade agreements may aﬀect
the environment: the free trade agreement acts as a catalyst by which governments reduce
pollution-causing subsidies. The subsidies are typically in industries facing foreign compe-
tition. Therefore, changes in subsidies aﬀect trade ﬂows and the terms of trade, and the
ultimate eﬀect on pollution depends signiﬁcantly on what fraction of domestic production
is consumed domestically. We show that pollution is more likely to rise in economies that
are open (in the sense of most of domestic production is exported) following a decrease in
subsidies.
Our results are consistent with the strong technique eﬀect found by Antweiler, Copeland,
and Taylor (2001). They ﬁnd increases in income are associated with large reductions in
pollution intensity, which they attribute to an income eﬀect on abatement policy. We ﬁnd
another reason why pollution intensity may fall following a trade agreement, which helps
explain the magnitude of the overall technique eﬀect in the data.
The related literature on how perverse subsidies to industry aﬀect the environment is less
developed.4 Since almost all countries have industrial policies which favor some industries,
what eﬀect subsidies have on the environment is an important question. Bajona and Chu
(2010) provide a computational model where private and state owned ﬁrms coexist. We
use this idea to develop a general theory of subsidies and pollution. The industry structure
consists of private and subsidized ﬁrms, facing domestic and foreign competition. To receive
4Barde and Honkatukia (2004) discuss the extent of subsidies in environmentally sensitive industries and
discuss a few channels by which subsidies may aﬀect the quality of the environment, but note that a full
assessment would require a general equilibrium analysis, which we do here. van Beers and van den Bergh
(2001) show in a static, partial equilibrium setting how subsidies can increase output and pollution in a
small open economy. Fisher-Vanden and Ho (2007) show that capital subsidies reduce the cost of adopting a
carbon tax in China, since the carbon tax oﬀsets some of the distortions caused by the capital subsidy. More
established is the literature on agricultural subsidies and the environment (see for example Antle, Lekakis,
and Zanias 1998).
3subsidies, subsidized ﬁrms must agree to employ more labor than is eﬃcient, which we
model as a minimum labor requirement.5 In exchange, subsidized ﬁrms receive direct (cash)
subsidies to cover the negative proﬁts that result from the use of an ineﬃcient mix of capital
and labor.6 Subsidized ﬁrms also receive low interest loans from the government or state
owned banks, modeled as an interest rate subsidy.7 Finally, subsidized ﬁrms have lower total
factor productivity (TFP) relative to private sector ﬁrms.
We prove the existence of an equilibrium in which subsidized ﬁrms and private ﬁrms
co-exist with the share of production of subsidized ﬁrms determined endogenously by the
subsidies, labor requirements, and technology diﬀerences. Subsidies thus aﬀect pollution by
changing the share of production of the subsidized sector.
Our ﬁrm structure is somewhat related to that of Fisher-Vanden and Ho (2007). They
have interest subsidies but do not separately model subsidized and non-subsidized ﬁrms.
Instead, an exogenous percentage of capital in each industry is subsidized. In contrast, in
our model the share of capital which is subsidized is endogenous, and both subsidized and
non-subsidized ﬁrms co-exist. Thus, in their model a reduction in subsidies to a particular
industry causes capital to ﬂow to other industries, reducing pollution if other industries are
less pollution intensive via a composition eﬀect. In contrast, in our model a reduction in
subsidies causes capital to move endogenously from subsidized to private ﬁrms even within an
industry, reducing pollution if subsidized ﬁrms are more pollution intensive via a technique
eﬀect.
In our model, reducing subsidies aﬀects pollution through two main mechanisms. The
ﬁrst mechanism, which we call capital and labor resource reallocation eﬀects, is static in
nature and is the result of the reallocation of capital and labor from subsidized to private
ﬁrms that reducing subsidies induces. First, reducing direct subsidies decreases equilibrium
employment in subsidized ﬁrms, causing output to become more concentrated in private
ﬁrms. Second, this decrease in employment causes capital to ﬂow to the private sector,
further concentrating output in private ﬁrms. If subsidized ﬁrms are more pollution intensive,
5Although we take the labor requirement as exogenous, it is consistent with the idea that subsidized ﬁrms
increase employment to increase bargaining power with the government (Yin 2001).
6Direct subsidies can thus be thought of as “bailouts” for ﬁrms in danger of exiting the market due to
negative proﬁts.
7We are ignoring many other types of subsidies, see Barde and Honkatukia (2004) for a partial list. In
a subsequent paper, Kelly, David L. (2009) ranks many types of subsidies according to their environmental
damage in a theoretical, closed economy setting. In contrast, here we determine the eﬀect on pollution
of reducing the two subsidies that are the main focus of trade agreements such as the US-China bilateral
agreement, in an environment with trade. Further, in our setting, subsidies generate terms of trade eﬀects
which are not present in Kelly, David L. (2009).
4these two eﬀects cause pollution to decrease. However, as resources concentrate in the higher-
productivity private sector, overall output and therefore pollution rises. We derive suﬃcient
conditions on parameter values for which the ﬁrst two eﬀects are stronger than the third.
The second mechanism, which we call the capital accumulation eﬀect, is dynamic in
nature and aﬀects intertemporal decisions. On one hand, reducing subsidies to ﬁrms directly
reduces overall demand for capital. On the other hand, the rise in overall productivity caused
by the concentration of capital in the private sector tends to increase demand for capital.
We show conditions for which the former eﬀect is stronger so the return to capital falls with
subsidies, causing the capital accumulation to slow or fall, which implies pollution grows
more slowly or falls over time as well.
We calibrate the model to China in 1997, and simulate the eﬀect on pollution emissions of
the reduction in subsides required by the WTO agreement. Our calibration and numerical
results depend crucially on the size of the subsidies and the relative emissions intensity
between subsidized SOEs and private ﬁrms, which we assume are not subsidized. Using
a panel of industry level data in China from 1995-2007, we ﬁnd SOEs have signiﬁcantly
higher emissions intensity than private ﬁrms for three of four pollutants tested, controlling
for industry and time speciﬁc eﬀects.
An empirical literature exists which estimate the eﬀect of ownership on emissions or
emissions intensity, with diﬀerent data sets. As in our paper, most of these studies ﬁnd that
SOEs are more pollution intensive than private ﬁrms. Wang and Wheeler (2003) ﬁnd that
provinces in China with larger state owned sectors have higher emissions intensity. Wang
and Jin (2007) ﬁnd state owned plants in China are more emissions intensive than non-state
owned plants. However, Wang and Wheeler (2005) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in emissions
intensity between state owned and non-state owned plants (although 93% of their sample
is state owned). Pargal and Wheeler (1996) study biological oxygen demand in Indonesia
and ﬁnd that ﬁrms with a higher share of state owned equity are more pollution intensive.
Hettige, Huq, and Pargal (1996) survey studies with similar results.8 Talukdar and Meisner
(2001) consider CO2 emissions for a panel of countries and ﬁnd that countries with a higher
share of GDP produced by the public sector have higher emissions.
In addition several studies ﬁnd that SOEs in some countries are held to lower standards for
environmental compliance. Gupta and Saksena (2002) ﬁnd that SOEs in India are monitored
for environmental compliance less often than private ﬁrms. Dasgupta, Laplante, Mamingi,
and Wang (2001) ﬁnd that SOEs in China enjoy more bargaining power over environmental
8Most of these studies control only for broad industry ﬁxed eﬀects, it is possible that SOEs specialize in
emissions intensive good within an industry. Thus, these studies are suggestive, but not deﬁnitive.
5compliance than private ﬁrms. However, Earnhart and Lizal (2006) ﬁnd an inverse relation-
ship between pollution intensity and percentage of state ownership among recently partially
privatized ﬁrms in the Czech Republic in their preferred model. The latter study focuses on
a change in ownership, which does not necessarily imply a change in subsidies.9
In the next section, we develop a theory of pollution, subsidies, and trade, and in Section
3 derive intuitive theoretical conditions for which pollution falls following a decrease in
subsidies. Section 4 develops a computational version of the model and calibrates the model
to China in 1997, prior to the WTO agreement. Section 5 gives the computational results,
Section 6 considers various robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes.
2 A Theory of Pollution, Subsidies, and Trade
In this section, we consider a simpliﬁed version of the computational model in Section 4
in order to derive some analytic results on how subsidies aﬀect pollution emissions. The
intuition gleaned from the theory carries over directly to the computational model, but the
additional features of the computational model allow for better quantitative predictions.
2.1 Firms
Private and subsidized ﬁrms diﬀer in four aspects: productivity, pollution intensity, ability to
choose their labor input, and cost of capital. Productivity diﬀerences are taken as exogenous,
with subsidized ﬁrms having TFP equal to AG, while private ﬁrms have TFP equal to AP.
Private and subsidized ﬁrms produce using a technology F and are competitive price takers.10
Their production functions diﬀer only in their TFP levels.
We assume employment at subsidized ﬁrms is constrained to be greater than or equal
to a minimum labor requirement, lG, established by the government. In exchange, the gov-
ernment covers any losses through direct (cash) subsidies. If the labor requirement binds,
subsidized ﬁrms use an ineﬃcient mix of capital and labor and earn negative proﬁts. Sub-
sidized and private ﬁrms then co-exist if subsidized ﬁrms receive enough direct subsidies
from the government to earn zero proﬁts.11 Therefore, let S = −πG be the direct subsidy,
where πG are the (negative) proﬁts of subsidized ﬁrms excluding the direct subsidy and
ΠG = πG + S = 0 are the proﬁts including the direct subsidy. We assume subsidized ﬁrms
9It is well known that recently privatized SOEs retain a close relationship to the state and thus possibly
their subsidies. A trade agreement is diﬀerent from privatization in that the former reduces subsidies, while
the latter changes ownership.
10Some subsidized ﬁrms clearly have monopoly power. This assumption is discussed in Section 7.
11In the absence of subsidies, in a competitive equilibrium only the ﬁrm with the highest TFP operates.
6take S as given, which is not restrictive since the ﬁrm cannot increase proﬁts by taking into
account that its decisions aﬀect S. To save on notation, we suppress the time t subscripts
where no confusion is possible.
Let lP be the labor demand of the private sector. The representative household is endowed
with one unit of labor every period, which is supplied inelastically. Therefore, in equilibrium
lG + lP = 1.
Subsidized ﬁrms receive a second subsidy, a discount on their rental rate of capital,
which we call an interest subsidy. If we denote the rental rate of capital for private ﬁrms
as ˆ r (measured in terms of world goods), the rental rate of capital for subsidized ﬁrms is
(1−s)ˆ r, where s is the subsidy rate. Interest subsidies can be interpreted as the government
guaranteeing repayment of funds borrowed by subsidized ﬁrms or steering household deposits
at state owned banks to subsidized ﬁrms at reduced interest rates or as SOEs borrowing at
the government’s rate of interest.12
The objective of both private and subsidized ﬁrms is to maximize proﬁts taking prices
and government policies as given. If the subsidized ﬁrm is privately owned, then proﬁt maxi-
mization is clearly reasonable. But even if the subsidized ﬁrm is state owned, evidence exists
for the idea that managers of SOEs are given incentives consistent with proﬁt maximiza-
tion.13 Our theory is not based on diﬀerences in ﬁrm ownership, since whether households or
ﬁrms own the capital is irrelevant as long as all ﬁrms maximize proﬁts. Instead, our theory
is based on the subsidies that ﬁrms with a close relationship to the state enjoy.
The problem for private ﬁrms is standard. Let qD denote the world price of the domes-
tically produced good, then:
πP = max
KP,lP
qDAPF (KP,lP) − ˆ rKP − ˆ wlP. (2.1)
Here KP and KG are the parts of the aggregate per person capital stock allocated to the
private and subsidized sectors, respectively, and K = KG+KP is the aggregate capital stock
per person. Let subscripts on functions denote partial derivatives. The equilibrium rental
and wage rates (in terms of domestic goods), r and w, are:
r = ˆ r/qD = APFk (K − KG,1 − lG), (2.2)
12The latter two interpretations are more reasonable for developing countries. All three interpretations
are consistent with households renting capital.
13For China, Yin (2001) assumes SOEs maximize proﬁts, based on the results from Choe and Yin (2000).
However, by making this assumption we are ignoring agency issues and other problems associated with SOEs
(see for example Gupta 2005, Shleifer and Vishny 1994).
7w = ˆ w/qD = APFl (K − KG,1 − lG). (2.3)
The problem of a subsidized ﬁrm consists of maximizing proﬁts subject to the minimum
labor constraint. The labor constraint is binding (subsidized ﬁrms hire more labor than
is eﬃcient) if and only if ˆ w > qDAGFl (KG,lG). If subsidized ﬁrms hire less labor than is
eﬃcient, they make positive proﬁts and the direct subsidy is a tax. Since this case is not
interesting, we assume the constraint binds,14 which implies:
πG = max
KG
qDAGF (KG,lG) − (1 − s) ˆ rKG − ˆ wlG. (2.4)
The ﬁrst order condition which determines the part of the capital stock allocated to the
subsidized sector is:
(1 − s)r = AGFk (KG,lG). (2.5)
Let F be constant returns to scale in K and l, have positive and diminishing marginal
products, satisfy F (0,l) = F (K,0) = 0, and satisfy the Inada conditions in each input.
Then equations (2.5), (2.2), and (2.3) have a unique solution KG (K,AG/AP (1 − s),lG),
r = r (K,AG/AP (1 − s),lG), and w = w(K,AG/AP (1 − s),lG).




























< 0 ⇔ AP (1 − s) < AG. (2.8)
Thus changes in the subsidies change the share of capital, labor, and output of the subsidized
sector, which drives many of the results of the paper. Consider ﬁrst a decrease in the interest
subsidy rate. A decrease in the interest subsidy rate implies a reallocation of capital from
the subsidized sector to the private sector. Further, a decrease in the interest subsidy rate
decreases the total demand for capital, hence the interest rate must fall to bring demand
for capital back up to the supply. Similarly, a fall in the demand for capital implies a lower
14A somewhat restrictive suﬃcient condition for the constraint to bind is: (1 − s)AP > AG. For a Cobb-
Douglas production function with capital share α, the constraint binds if and only if (1 − s)
α AP > AG.
8demand for labor as well so the wage rate must also fall. Consider second a fall in the
labor requirement. Although a fall in the labor requirement will cause labor to move from
the subsidized sector the private sector by deﬁnition, it is not immediate that the wage rate
falls. Instead, the fall in the labor requirement causes the subsidized sector to reduce demand
for capital as well. If the private sector sees suﬃciently little increase in capital relative to
the increase in labor, wages fall, but it could be that a large change in capital in the private
sector causes demand for labor to rise, pushing up wages. The overall eﬀect depends on the
relative TFP of the two sectors.
Finally, the share of capital allocated to the subsidized sector adjusts to equate the
after-subsidy returns in the two sectors. The interest subsidy causes capital to ﬂow to the
subsidized sector, reducing the marginal product of capital in that sector and raising the
marginal product of capital in the private sector until the after-subsidy returns are equated.
Thus, the equation which governs the fraction of capital allocated to the subsidized sector
is:
(1 − s)APFk (K − KG,1 − lG) = AGFk (KG,lG). (2.9)
2.2 Households
2.2.1 Aggregate Good
Households enjoy consumption of an aggregate good c, which is a composite of the domestic
produced good, Y , and the imported good, M. Let u(c) denote the per period utility, which
we assume is strictly increasing and concave, twice-continuously diﬀerentiable, and satisﬁes






Let XD denote the part of domestic production that is consumed domestically, and XF denote
the part of domestic production that is consumed abroad. Households use an Armington





15The Armington aggregator assumption is a standard assumption (see for example Fisher-Vanden and
Ho 2007), which is made in order to be able to match trade ﬂows. In order to simplify the analytical
derivations, we assume that the aggregator is a Cobb-Douglas function. In the computational model, we
assume the aggregator is a more realistic CES function. The qualitative results are very similar to the
theoretical model’s.
9We can interpret   as the share of domestic production consumed domestically. The com-
posite good can also be used for investment. Notice that because each country specializes in
one good, we are ruling out eﬀects due to comparative advantage like the PHH and the factor
endowment hypothesis. This allows us to examine the eﬀect of subsidies on the environment
in isolation of other channels by which free trade agreements aﬀect the environment. The
total eﬀect of the free trade agreement on the environment will be the combination of all of
these channels. Let primes denote next period’s value and δ the depreciation rate. Then the
aggregate resource constraint is:
Yc = C + K
′ − (1 − δ)K. (2.12)
Households use an eﬃcient mix of XD and M to form the aggregate good. Let qc denote
the world price of the aggregate good, and qw (1 + τD) denote the domestic price of the
imported good, where τD is a tariﬀ and qw is the world price, normalized to one.





1−µ = qD, (2.13)
(1 −  )qcX
µ
DM
−µ = 1 + τD. (2.14)
Hence the marginal rate of technical substitution equals the price ratio:









We assume a small open economy framework. Let τF denote the world tariﬀ on domestic
production, then the foreign demand curve for domestically produced goods is:
XF = ˆ D(qD (1 + τF))
−1
1−ζ . (2.16)
Here − /(1 −  ) < ζ < 1 and ˆ D is a constant. If foreigners also use a Cobb-Douglas








10We assume capital markets are closed.16 Therefore, trade in goods must balance:
M = qDXF. (2.18)
2.3 Government
The government budget is balanced by a lump sum transfer to households, ˆ TR. Thus the
government budget constraint sets interest plus direct subsidies equal to lump sum taxes
plus tariﬀ revenue TF ≡ τDM:
sˆ rKG + S = − ˆ TR + TF. (2.19)
It is straightforward to show that the direct subsidies equal total wage payments less the
total product of labor, that is, direct subsidies equal the total cost of the hiring constraint.
Hence in terms of domestic goods:




where TR ≡ ˆ TR/qD.
2.4 Market Clearing
Market clearing requires demand for domestic goods to equal domestic production, Y :
XD + XF = Y. (2.21)
Further, the value of domestic production plus tariﬀ revenue must equal income from factor
payments plus transfers:




(rK + w + TR). (2.23)
16If we instead assumed a small open economy with a ﬁxed interest rate, then the equilibrium function
KG (.) is unchanged and subsidies will still cause the economy to over-accumulate capital since the demand
for capital still rises. We also ran computational experiments with open capital markets and the results were
qualitatively unchanged.
112.5 Pollution
We assume emissions, E, of a ﬂow pollutant are proportional to domestic production. Let Yi
denote output and σi denote the emissions intensity of output in sector i ∈ {G,P}. Then:
E = σGYG + σPYP. (2.24)
No abatement technology exists, so pollution falls only by reducing output or by moving
production to the less pollution intensive sector.17 Given that the private and subsidized
sectors are at diﬀerent technology levels, it is reasonable to assume that they also have
diﬀerent pollution intensities. We can write total pollution as a fraction of total output, Y :
E = σY. (2.25)




, Y ≡ YG + YP. (2.26)
3 Theoretical Results
To characterize the equilibrium, we substitute out for the ﬁrm and trade variables so as to
write the model as a single capital accumulation problem. Equations (2.15), (2.17), and
(2.18) imply the domestic demand curve is:
XD =
 





Substitution of the foreign demand curve (2.17) and the domestic demand curve (3.1)







 (1 + τD)
1 +  τD
. (3.2)
Hence:
XD = ψY, (3.3)
17We do not include abatement as we wish to focus on the direct eﬀect of subsidies on pollution. Including
an abatement technology such that optimal abatement increases with income would strengthen our results.
12XF = (1 − ψ)Y, (3.4)
M = D










Note that ψ is the share of domestic output consumed domestically, with ψ =   if τD = 0.
Finally, substituting the prices and equation (2.23) into the aggregate resource constraint
implies:
C + K





Ω ≡  ψ
−(1−µ) (1 − ψ)
φ−µ D
1−φ, (3.8)
φ ≡   + ζ (1 −  ). (3.9)
Here φ =   and Ω =  (D/ψ)
(1−µ) if foreigners use a Cobb-Douglas Armington aggregator.
The resource constraint (3.7) shows how foreign demand aﬀects resources available for aggre-
gate consumption or investment. Note that under our maintained assumptions, φ ∈ (0,1).
Let k denote the capital stock of an individual, then after substituting for the prices, the
recursive household problem is:





















We characterize the model by establishing the existence and properties of the equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 A Recursive Competitive Equilibrium given individual and aggregate capital
stocks k and K and government policies {τF, τD, s, lG} is a set of individual household deci-
sions {c, k′}, trade decisions {XD, XF, M}, prices {r, w, qD, qc}, aggregate household de-
cisions {C, K′}, a subsidized ﬁrm input decision KG, private ﬁrm input decisions {KP, lP},
government variables {S, TR}, and a value function v such that the household’s and produc-
ers’ (private and subsidized) problems are satisﬁed, all markets clear, subsidized ﬁrms earn
13zero proﬁts, the government budget constraint is satisﬁed, and the consistency conditions
(k = K implies c = C and k′ = K′) are satisﬁed.
Our deﬁnition of equilibrium takes the labor requirement as given and determines an equi-
librium direct subsidy such that both ﬁrms co-exist. In the simulations it is more convenient
to take the direct subsidy as given and determine an equilibrium labor requirement. These
deﬁnitions have identical allocations, so we do not distinguish between them.
The equilibrium ﬁrst order condition and envelope equation determine aggregate capital
accumulation:
uc (C (K;s;lG)) = βvk (K
′,K
′) (3.11)




1−φr (K;s;lG) + 1 − δ
 
(3.12)





′ + (1 − δ)K (3.13)
Y (K;s;lG) = APF (K − KG (K;s;lG),1 − lG) + AGF (KG (K;s;lG),lG) (3.14)
Our strategy is to establish some basic properties of the competitive equilibrium, and
then use these properties to derive the more complicated results on how pollution changes
with changes in subsidies.
THEOREM 1 Suppose u and F are as described above and w > srKG (K)+S (K) for all
K. Then a competitive equilibrium exists. Further, the equilibrium gross investment function
K′ = H (K) is such that:
1. HK (K) ≥ 0,
2. CK (K) ≥ 0,
3. H (K) satisﬁes the Euler equation derived from (3.11) and (3.12), and
4. H (K) is concave.
All proofs are in the Appendix. Theorem 1 requires total subsidies not exceed total wages,
so that income remains positive, which is not very restrictive.18
18For Cobb-Douglas production with capital share α, s < (1 − α)/α is suﬃcient.
14A trade agreement often consists of a combination of reductions in tariﬀs and subsidies
to domestic enterprises. In order to derive intuition on the eﬀect of each type of government
subsidy, we consider each in isolation. In particular, we consider a reduction in the interest
subsidy rate leaving the labor requirement unchanged (notice that this increases the losses
made by subsidized ﬁrms and, thus, the direct subsidies), a reduction in direct subsidies,
where the labor requirement is relaxed so that interest subsidies are kept constant, and a
reduction in world tariﬀs.
3.1 The Eﬀect of Reducing Interest Subsidies
Consider ﬁrst a reduction in the interest subsidy rate to ﬁrms, holding the labor requirement
ﬁxed. According to the industrial structure described above, direct subsidies must rise so
that subsidized ﬁrms continue to earn zero proﬁts. Diﬀerentiating the pollution accumulation
















Equation (2.9) implies the after-subsidy marginal products are equal. Hence:











From equation (3.15), a decrease in the interest subsidy rate causes capital to ﬂow from
the more pollution intensive government sector to the less pollution intensive private sector,
reducing pollution. However, due to the subsidy the private sector has a higher marginal
product of capital, so output rises as capital ﬂows to the private sector. It follows that for
overall pollution emissions to fall, the ratio of emissions intensities must be greater than the
ratio of marginal products, which equals 1
1−s.
Let ¯ x denote the steady state value of any variable x. In addition to the static eﬀect, a
decrease in interest subsidies has a dynamic eﬀect on pollution through changes in the path
of capital accumulation.
THEOREM 2 Let F and u be as described above and suppose a decrease in s holding lG
ﬁxed. Let K0 = ¯ K. Then:
151. The economy transitions to a new steady state
  ¯ ¯ K, ¯ ¯ E
 
with ¯ ¯ K < ¯ K. Further, ¯ ¯ E < ¯ E
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, i = G,P (3.18)
Furthermore, if condition (3.17) also holds, then:
2. Investment falls for all t:
∂Kt+1
∂s > 0 ∀t ≥ 0 and
3. pollution falls for all t: ∂Et
∂s > 0 ∀t ≥ 0.
If subsidized ﬁrms are suﬃciently more pollution intensive, the capital reallocation resulting
from a decrease in the interest subsidy rate causes current pollution to fall. This is the
capital resource reallocation eﬀect. In addition, the reduction in interest subsidies lowers
the overall return to capital, causing investment to fall. Since pollution is an increasing
function of output, future pollution and steady state pollution fall as well. This is the capital
accumulation eﬀect. Because the capital accumulation eﬀect causes pollution to fall with
subsidies regardless of pollution intensity, the condition needed for steady state pollution
to decrease with a reduction in subsidies is weaker. That is, if (3.17) is not satisﬁed but
condition (3.18) holds, then, following a decrease in interest subsidies, initially pollution rises
but subsequently falls to a lower steady state. Condition (3.18) is easily checked since θP is
the share of income accruing to the private capital owners and αP measures the curvature
of the production function. Note that a suﬃcient condition for condition (3.18) is σG > σP.
Therefore, steady state pollution falls with a decrease in interest subsidies if the subsidized
sector is more pollution intensive than the private sector, as is commonly found in the
literature (e.g. Wang and Jin 2007).
It is straightforward to interpret the capital reallocation eﬀect in terms of the familiar










After simplifying, we obtain:
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∂s












16Hence the technique term is positive for σG > σP and the scale term is negative. Therefore,
a decrease in the interest subsidy rate reduces current pollution through a technique eﬀect
and increases current pollution through a scale eﬀect. Given condition (3.17), the technique
eﬀect dominates and a reduction in the subsidy rate causes pollution to fall. Reducing the
interest subsidy rate lowers steady state output, since the increase in productivity is more
than oﬀset by the fall in steady state capital. Hence both the technique and scale eﬀects
cause steady state pollution to fall with interest subsidies.
3.2 The Eﬀect of Reducing Direct Subsidies
Next we consider a reduction in direct subsidies, holding the interest subsidy rate ﬁxed.
With s ﬁxed, if subsidized ﬁrms are to earn zero proﬁts direct subsidies can be reduced
only by relaxing the labor requirement. The following theorem shows that under a stronger
condition, reducing direct subsidies causes pollution to fall.
THEOREM 3 Let F and u be as described above and suppose a decrease in lG holding s
ﬁxed. Let K0 = ¯ K.




(1 − φ)(ΓGθP + ΓPθG) + αPαGΓP





Further, if conditions (3.17) and (2.8) hold, then:
2. pollution falls below ¯ E for all t ≥ 0, and
3. for periods t > 1, pollution transitions monotonically to ¯ ¯ E < ¯ E.
In the initial period the labor requirement decreases to oﬀset the reduction in direct subsidies
causing a labor reallocation eﬀect. As labor moves from subsidized to private ﬁrms it becomes
more productive (from AGFl to w), which tends to increase output and therefore pollution.
However, if private ﬁrms are less pollution intensive, pollution tends to fall when labor moves
from subsidized to private ﬁrms. Condition (2.8) implies 1/(1 − s) is larger than the wage
ratio. Hence condition (3.17) is suﬃcient for the technique eﬀect to outweigh the scale
eﬀect. Capital also moves to the private sector, so we have a capital reallocation eﬀect, but
condition (3.17) implies that the capital reallocation eﬀect causes pollution to fall as well.
17After the initial fall in pollution, the labor requirement does not change, but a capital
accumulation eﬀect exists, as capital converges to a new steady state. The behavior of
pollution in the transition to the new steady state depends on whether condition (2.8) holds.
If condition (2.8) holds, as required by the theorem, then the interest rate falls and capital
declines monotonically to a new steady state. Thus pollution declines monotonically to a
new steady state below the initial drop in pollution.
If condition (2.8) does not hold, then steady state capital may rise or fall after the
reduction in the labor requirement and the wage ratio is larger than 1
1−s. Therefore current
pollution will fall if σG/σP is greater than the wage ratio. If the steady state capital rises,
steady state pollution rises unless σG/σP is large enough to oﬀset the increase in steady state
pollution caused by the increase in steady state capital (condition 3.21).












In the calibration, condition (3.22) is satisﬁed for all pollutants.
Notice that if the conditions of Theorem 3 are satisﬁed, then a trade agreement which
reduces both direct and interest subsidies (and therefore relaxes the labor requirement), also
reduces pollution.
As in the previous section, we can break down the eﬀect of direct subsidies on pollution
into a positive technique term and a negative scale term. Thus Theorem 3 gives suﬃcient
conditions for the technique eﬀect to dominate, so that a reduction in direct subsidies reduces
current pollution.
3.3 Terms of Trade Eﬀects
Capital and labor reallocation eﬀects determine changes in current period pollution. Re-
allocation and capital accumulation eﬀects determine steady state pollution. In an open
economy, changes in subsidies may cause terms of trade eﬀects, which in turn may aﬀect
steady state pollution. If steady state output rises with subsidies, then in a small open econ-
omy excess supply on world markets will depress the terms of trade. The domestic interest
rate will then fall, since capital accumulation is not as attractive, weakening the capital
accumulation eﬀect.
The next theorem makes precise the eﬀect of subsidies on the terms of trade.
18THEOREM 4 Let F and u be as described above. Then the steady state terms of trade,
¯ qD
¯ qC is decreasing in s, and is increasing in lG if and only if condition (2.8) holds.
A reduction in interest subsidies reduces steady state production. Since we have a small
open economy and supply falls, the export price increases and terms of trade improves. The
decline in the return to capital caused by the decrease in s is moderated by the improvement
in the terms of trade. Since the incentive to deaccumulate capital is weaker, the capital
accumulation eﬀect is weaker, especially for economies with large trade sectors. Consider,
for example, the case where foreigners use a Cobb-Douglas Armington aggregator, so φ =  
is the share of domestic output consumed domestically. For an economy with no trade sector
(φ = 1), the capital accumulation eﬀect is strong and condition (3.18) is satisﬁed regardless
of σG/σP. Conversely, if all output is exported (φ = 0) then the capital accumulation eﬀect is
weakest. Using the calibrated values from the next section except for φ = 0, condition (3.18)
becomes σG > 0.36σP. Hence, if σG < 0.36σP, pollution falls with a decrease in subsidies for
countries with small trade sectors but rises for countries with large trade sectors.
Interestingly, a reduction in lG has the opposite eﬀect on the terms of trade if condition
(2.8) holds. Although a decrease in direct subsidies decreases the steady state capital stock,
steady state output rises if condition (2.8) holds since moving labor and capital to the more
eﬃcient private sector outweighs the eﬀect on output of a lower steady state capital stock.
Since steady state output rises, the export price falls and the terms of trade worsen. Thus,
the incentive to deaccumulate capital and the capital accumulation eﬀect is stronger if and
only if (2.8) holds, especially for countries with large trade sectors. It is straightforward to
show that condition (3.21) is more restrictive for φ = 1 than for φ = 0 if and only if (2.8)
holds. Using the calibrated parameter values presented in the next section (except for φ),
we see that condition (3.21) reduces to σG > 1.10σP for φ = 1 and σG > 1.02σP for φ = 0.
In summary, the eﬀects on steady state pollution from a decrease in subsidies can be
very diﬀerent in countries with large and small trade sectors, due to eﬀects of subsidies on
the terms of trade.
3.4 The Eﬀect of Reducing Tariﬀs
In the third experiment, we suppose a trade treaty requires the world to lower tariﬀs on the
exported good. Equation (2.17) implies that this is equivalent to a shift of the world demand
curve for the exported good, which increases Ω.
The eﬀect on pollution of a trade treaty which lowers world tariﬀs is then:
19THEOREM 5 Let F and u be as described above and suppose an increase in Ω holding lG
and s ﬁxed. Let K0 = ¯ K. Then:
1. There is no eﬀect on current pollution,
2. investment rises,
3. pollution rises for t ≥ 1,
4. The economy transitions to a new steady state
  ¯ ¯ K, ¯ ¯ E
 
with higher pollution (¯ ¯ E > ¯ E)
and capital ( ¯ ¯ K > ¯ K).
Note that an increase in domestic tariﬀs increases Ω and pollution for ψ (1 − ζ) < 1 (satisﬁed
if ζ = 0). If both foreign and domestic tariﬀs fall in a trade treaty, then the eﬀect on Ω and
therefore pollution depends on the size of the preexisting tariﬀs.
The increase in foreign demand that follows a reduction of the world trade barriers
improves the return to capital and increases investment, which in turn results in the creation
of more pollution-causing factories.
No technique eﬀect exists here, the only eﬀect of a change in world tariﬀs is the eﬀect on
capital accumulation. In this sense, our results diﬀer from Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor
(2001), who ﬁnd a technique eﬀect due to lowering trade barriers. Their technique eﬀect is
driven by abatement policy, which is constant in our model. Furthermore, we have ruled out
the PHH and the factor endowment hypothesis by assumption.
Hence a trade treaty that reduces subsidies as well as tariﬀs has an ambiguous eﬀect
on pollution. However, we argue here (and show in the simulations for the case of China)
that overall pollution is likely to fall if the conditions of Theorem 3 hold. The reason is
that ﬁrst both foreign and domestic tariﬀs generally fall, so the eﬀect on Ω is ambiguous.
But even if Ω rises, the trade treaty has an ambiguous scale eﬀect on pollution causing-
capital accumulation (interest subsidies fall but the return to capital increases with foreign
demand), but an unambiguous technique eﬀect on pollution, caused by capital ﬂowing to
the less pollution intensive private sector.
4 Computational Model
4.1 Extended Model
In this section we use a dynamic applied general equilibrium model (AGE) in order to
assess the quantitative eﬀects of changes in tariﬀs and subsidies associated with China’s
20accession to the WTO on pollution emissions. In order to make quantitative predictions,
the computational model adds several features not present in the theoretical model.19 The
computational model is an extension of Bajona and Chu (2010) that allows for international
trade (capital markets are still closed).




, F (K,l) = K
αl
1−α. (4.1)
Next, we add several features which result in a more realistic calibration and better quan-
titative predictions. First, we assume the population L grows at exogenous rate n. Labor
augmenting technical change with growth rate γ exists, so that AG and AP, grow at exoge-
nous rate (1 + γ)
1−α−1. We assume foreign demand also grows at rate γ, which is consistent
with the existence of a balanced growth path. The Armington aggregator in the production
of the aggregate good is CES:









1−ζ is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and foreign produced goods
and Z is a technology parameter.
The computational model also adds exogenous government purchases per capita, G, and
taxes on producers of ﬁnal goods, T, which better matches China’s revenue sources. The
government budget constraint is now:
qcG + sˆ rKG + S + ˆ TR = TF + T. (4.3)
Here production tax revenues are:
T = tqDY. (4.4)
The government budget constraint remains balanced with a lump sum transfer. Thus, for
example, reductions in the subsidy rate raise lump sum transfers. In the next section, we
consider an alternative assumption that the government constraint is balanced by adjusting
the production tax rate.
The domestic market clearing equation for the aggregate good is modiﬁed to include
19None of these features are critical for our qualitative analysis of the eﬀect of subsidies on pollution and,
therefore, the intuition from the simpliﬁed model applies to the quantitative model.
21government demand:
C + I + G = Yc. (4.5)
Exogenous improvements in pollution intensity, 1






Here EI grows exogenously at rate γ, which is consistent with a stationary level of pollution
emissions.
4.2 Data and Calibration
Our model assumes that SOEs behave as competitive price takers with respect to output
prices, interest rates, and wages. This assumption matches reasonably well with the Chinese
experience. In particular, in 1997, SOE share of industry value added was 38% for all
industry classiﬁcations, which lends support to the idea that SOEs are not large enough to
move prices. Further, China has given managers at SOEs performance incentives consistent
with proﬁt maximization (Choe and Yin 2000). Our assumption that households own capital
is consistent with China in that most household savings are deposited at state owned banks,
which then lend to SOEs at preferential rates.
Our calibration follows the procedure of Bajona and Chu (2010), who calibrate in order to
match data on the Chinese National Income and Product Accounts, the Chinese input-output
matrix, and the share of SOEs in Chinese industry for 1997. We use only China’s industry
sectors (mining, manufacturing, and electricity/gas/water supply), since data on emissions
for services and agriculture are not available. The calibration of the trade-related parameters
follows standard procedures in AGE models. The values of the calibrated parameters are
reported in Table 1.
The most critical economic parameters are the interest subsidy rate, the labor constraint,
and the diﬀerence in productivity between SOEs and private ﬁrms. The calibration sets the
interest subsidy rate so that the diﬀerence in the capital to output ratios between private
ﬁrms and SOEs in the model matches the data. SOEs used 60% of the capital, but produced
only 38% of the output in 1997. To explain the high capital to output ratio of SOEs, the
model calibration requires an interest subsidy rate of 0.59.20
20In our calibration the 60% of capital owned by SOEs receive a subsidy of 0.59, for an economy wide
22We calibrate the minimum labor requirement such that the model SOE losses, which
equal direct subsidies, equal the subsidies to loss making SOEs in the data. A minimum
labor requirement equal to 40% of the labor force gives SOE losses equal to about 1.2% of
value added, which matches the data.21 Given a capital share equal to the fraction of private
income accruing to owners of private capital, the total factor productivity may be calculated
using the deﬁnition of the production function. Table 1 shows that TFP is about 56% higher
for private ﬁrms.22
For the critical emissions intensity parameters, national and industry level emissions data
is available for four pollutants, but SOE emissions are not reported separately. However,
industry emissions and SOE industry shares are available, which allows us to estimate the
aggregate SOE pollution intensity using industry data.
4.2.1 Data
We gathered industry emissions data for air pollutants SO2, soot, and industrial dust and for
the water pollutant COD from various editions of the China Environment Yearbook (1996-
2008 covering years 1995-2007). Industry air pollutant emissions data for the same pollutants
and period are also available from various editions of the Chinese Statistical Yearbook (here-
after CSY). In general the data are identical, but a few (less than ﬁve) data points show
obvious recording errors in one source or the other, which were corrected. Reported emis-
sions are the total of a survey of ﬁrms which account for 85% of emissions, and an estimate
which accounts for remaining 15% of emissions.
China switched their industry classiﬁcation system twice during the period of data cov-
erage. The three classiﬁcation systems are 1984, 1994, and 2002, designated for the year
in which industry output data began reporting under the given classiﬁcation. However,
emissions data was reported using the 1984 classiﬁcation system until 2001, and then was
reported using the 1994 classiﬁcation system for 2001 and 2002 before switching to the 2002
classiﬁcation system in 2003.
The CSY reports nominal value added by industry for 1995-2007 for both industrial
average subsidy of 0.35. Our subsidy rate is lower than the value calibrated by Fisher-Vanden and Ho (2007),
using a diﬀerent methodology. They report 53% of the capital stock (“plan capital”) received a subsidy of
0.9 in 1995, for an economy wide average subsidy of 0.48.
21SOEs may sometimes subject to price controls (Young 2000), especially for consumer goods, which is an
alternative reason for SOE losses. Our view is that this is less likely to be an issue in the industry sectors
considered here. Imposing price controls on SOEs requires separate output price data for SOEs and private
ﬁrms, which is not available.
22The simulation results are not sensitive to this parameter. Reducing the TFP diﬀerence to 25% produced
only small changes in the results (less than 3%).
23SOEs and all industrial ﬁrms, with the exception of 1998 and 2004. From the nominal value
added data, we construct industry SOE shares and industry shares of total value added. In
1998, however, China changed both the deﬁnition of an SOE and the scope of coverage of
the value added measure. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms in which the state held a controlling share were
reclassiﬁed from private to state-owned. Firms with size smaller than ﬁve million yuan were
no longer included in the value added measure after 1998. Since state-owned ﬁrms tend to
be large, both changes dramatically increased the measured SOE shares in 1999. Despite an
overall downward trend in SOE shares (for example, from 1996-7 SOE shares increased in
only three industries), SOE shares increased in 17 of 18 industries from 1997-9, presumably
due to the measurement changes.
For the price deﬂators, Holz (2006) reports real and nominal gross output value (GOV)
data (1990 prices) by industry for 1993-2002 using the the 1994 classiﬁcation system, which
is in turn collected from various statistical yearbooks. Two issues arise when using these
price deﬂators. First, GOV is a measure of revenue, not value added. Second, ﬁrms directly
report real GOV data. Young (2003) questions the accuracy of the implicit price deﬂators
derived from reported data. The CSY (2006-7) reports ex-factory (producer) price indices of
industrial products derived independently from the reporting ﬁrms for the years 2002-2007,
using 2001 as the base year. We use the Holz data until 2001 and the ex-factory price indices
for 2002-2007, which results in the largest data set. The results are similar regardless of
the deﬂator used for 2001 and 2002, the years for which both deﬂators exist. We removed
any new industry categories introduced in 2003 since no data is available to convert to 1990
prices. Further, the Holz data must be aggregated to be compatible with the 1995-2000
emissions data, since Holz’s data uses the 1994 classiﬁcation system.
Later industry classiﬁcations are more disaggregated, although most are unchanged across
the entire data set. The 1984 system has 18 usable industries, the 1994 system has 23 indus-
tries which are new or for which the classiﬁcation system changed, with 3 old classiﬁcations
no longer being reported. The 2002 classiﬁcation adds many new industries which cannot be
used since we cannot convert the price data to 1990 dollars. Three industries which begin
in 2001 end in 2002 (two are discontinued and one is missing deﬂator data). In addition,
the emissions data include a few industry categories not available in the output data (such
as cement). These industries cannot be used since SOE share data does not include these
categories. Hence we have a panel of 41 industries, some of which begin in 2001 or end in
2002.23
23Controlling for industry ﬁxed eﬀects using more aggregate industry classiﬁcations in general produced
poor results, since aggregate classiﬁcations include both low and high emission industries.
24The usual caveats about working with Chinese data, especially price data, certainly
apply here. The results are robust to alternative data sources, which adds conﬁdence to
our results. In section 6, we perform sensitivity analysis to account for uncertainty in the
estimated emissions intensity parameters. In total, we have 296 observations, an unbalanced
panel of 41 industry classiﬁcations over 10 years.
4.2.2 Industry level calibration: estimation strategy












Yit denote the SOE share in industry i, then:
σit ≡ σPit (1 − vit) + σGitvit, (4.8)
≡ σPit + (σGit − σPit)vit. (4.9)
Equation (4.9) implies pollution intensity is a linear function of the SOE share. Both the
intercept and slope terms are time and industry speciﬁc. To estimate such a model requires
industry ﬁxed eﬀects terms, terms in which industry terms are interacted with total indus-
try SOE share, plus parameters accounting for time related changes in emissions intensity.
Unfortunately, it is infeasible to estimate this equation, since we have only 296 data points.
Therefore, we assume the slope is constant within industry groups. It turns out the choice
of groups has little eﬀect on the results, and the slope is fairly constant across industries.
However, we expect the slope term to be smaller after 1998. Enterprises in which the state
owns a simple majority interest are unlikely to have the same bargaining power over envi-
ronmental compliance as enterprises wholly owned by the state. Imposing these restrictions
implies:
(σGit − σPit) = η1 + η2 · 1(t > 1998) + ξ1it, ξ1it ∼ iid mean 0. (4.10)
Here η1 = (σG − σP)t<1998 is the parameter of interest, while η1+η2 measures the slope after
1998. We focus on η1 since most subsidy reductions in the WTO agreement are for SOEs
wholly owned by the state. For the constant term, we employ a ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation:
σPit = σPi + Q(η,t) + ξ2it, ξ2it ∼ iid mean 0. (4.11)
25Here Q is a function which measures reductions in emissions intensity over time, due to
technical change and possibly changes in data measurement. With these assumptions we
can then estimate the η parameters using:
σit = η0i + η1vit + η2vit1(t > 1998) + Q(η,t) + ξit, (4.12)
ξit = ξ1itvit + ξ2it. (4.13)
According to speciﬁcation (4.12), the errors will be heteroskedastic. We will consider for Q
a simple time trend and year speciﬁc eﬀects.
Given estimated coeﬃcients ˆ η0i and ˆ η1, it is straightforward to sum across industries to
obtain an estimate of the aggregate pollution intensity. Let sizeit ≡
Yit
Yt be the industry share




ˆ η0i · sizei,1997 + ˆ η1v1997. (4.14)




ˆ η0i · sizei,1997 , (4.15)
σG = σP + ˆ η1. (4.16)
One possible problem with using the industry speciﬁc eﬀects coeﬃcients to ﬁnd σP is
that the industry speciﬁc coeﬃcients may be estimated imprecisely, especially for industries
with few data points. An alternative is to combine equations (2.26) and (4.16) so that:
σP = σ − ˆ η1vG. (4.17)
Hence we can derive the aggregate private sector pollution intensity as the economy wide
average pollution intensity in the data less the estimated contribution of the SOE sector
pollution intensity to the economy wide average.
Our ﬁxed eﬀects estimation strategy accounts for industry speciﬁc variation in pollution
intensity. We are thus using within-industry variation over time (controlling for the time
trend) to estimate the diﬀerence in emissions intensity between SOEs and private ﬁrms.
Therefore, a reduction in subsidies to a particular industry generates reductions in emis-
26sions intensity in that industry as private ﬁrms with cleaner technologies replace SOEs (the
technique eﬀect).
4.2.3 Estimation Results
In addition to estimating (4.12) using ﬁxed eﬀects, we tried several variations of the model
to check for robustness. We ﬁnd that the results are not sensitive to the mixture of price
deﬂators used, and the signiﬁcance of the key coeﬃcient η1 is not sensitive to using alternative
output measures. Although not consistent with the theory developed in Section 2, we tried
a log speciﬁcation. The sign of η1 remains positive for all regressions but gains signiﬁcance
for COD and loses signiﬁcance for SO2. Controlling for the industry share of output results
in a smaller coeﬃcient for soot, but adds virtually no explanatory power to the regression.
The results are sensitive to the introduction of a time trend or time speciﬁc eﬀects. Thus we
report the results for industry ﬁxed eﬀects, with and without a time trend and time speciﬁc
eﬀects.
Tables 2-3 report the estimation results for OLS, industry ﬁxed eﬀects, industry ﬁxed
eﬀects including a time trend (our preferred model), and industry ﬁxed eﬀects with year ﬁxed
eﬀects. All t-statistics are calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity
using the White procedure.24
Comparing columns (1) and (2), we see the importance of industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Most of
the variation in pollution intensity across industries is due to industry variation unrelated
to the SOE share. The key coeﬃcient ˆ η1, which measures diﬀerences in emissions intensity
between SOEs and private ﬁrms is positive and signiﬁcant for all pollutants, for the ﬁxed
eﬀects speciﬁcation (column 2). Hence, even after controlling for industry speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects, SOEs are more pollution intensive. However, for all pollutants the magnitude of ˆ η1
is unrealistically large. For example, the SOE sector accounts for about 46% of value added
and economy wide average emissions intensity for COD is 0.57 tons per hundred thousand
1990 yuan. Thus, to reconcile a very large diﬀerence in pollution intensity between private
ﬁrms and SOEs requires σP to be negative for COD.
One explanation is that aggregate pollution is falling over time for reasons unrelated to
falling SOE shares, thus magnifying the estimate ˆ η1. When a time trend (column 3) or time
speciﬁc eﬀects (column 4) are added, ˆ η1 remains positive but loses signiﬁcance for COD (Soot
24Stock and Watson (2008) show that White’s procedure is inconsistent holding time ﬁxed as the number
of industries increases, but their correction requires all industries to have observations in at least three time
periods. Discarding the data with two time periods and using their correction did not materially alter the
results.
27is signiﬁcantly positive using a one sided test at the 95% level).25 The magnitude of ˆ η1 falls
for all pollutants. The addition of time variables does little to improve the ﬁt of the model
(none of the year coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant for any pollutant), but ˆ η1 is in its theoretical
range. Apparently, for COD, the data does not have enough within-industry, within-year
variation to pin down ˆ η1 very precisely.
For calibration and simulation purposes, we use regression (3). In the sensitivity analysis
section, we vary ˆ η1 to account for the uncertainty of the estimate and alternative regression
speciﬁcations. We omit COD from the simulations since the estimate for COD is very
imprecise.
Our regression results generally imply SOEs are much more emissions intensive than
private ﬁrms. Computing σG/σP for the time trend regression, we see that SOEs are 5 times
more emissions intensive for SO2, 3.8 times more emissions intensive for soot, and 9.3 times
more emissions intensive for dust, while the diﬀerence in emissions intensity is not signiﬁcant
for COD. These results are broadly consistent with the existing literature. In particular, our
speciﬁcation is most similar to Wang and Wheeler (2003), who use a province level panel
data set from 1987-1995 in China to estimate a model in which pollution charges and COD
emissions intensity are jointly determined, controlling for the share of output produced from
each sector in the province. Their results indicate a province with only state owned ﬁrms
would be 5.7 times as emissions intensive as a province consisting of only private ﬁrms.
Wang and Jin (2007) conducted a survey of 842 plants in China in 2000. After controlling
for industry ﬁxed eﬀects, they ﬁnd for total suspended solids that state owned ﬁrms are more
than twice as emissions intensive as non-state owned ﬁrms. Pargal and Wheeler (1996) ﬁnd
for biological oxygen demand in Indonesia that a 100% government owned ﬁrm is 18 times
more pollution intensive than a 100% privately owned ﬁrm, after controlling for industry
eﬀects and other factors.26 However, Wang and Wheeler (2005) use a survey of 3000 plants
in China in 1993 to estimate a model of endogenous pollution charges and emissions for a
variety of air and water pollutants. They ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between emissions of
SOEs and private ﬁrms, although 93% of their sample is state-owned.
25We tried other empirical speciﬁcations of the time trend and obtained similar results.
26All three papers use a log speciﬁcation log(σi) = ηxi +η1si+ζi, where xi is a vector of covariates, η are
the estimated parameters, si is either the SOE share of output or a dummy for state ownership, ζ is a random





Note, however, that the comparison is not exact since (in addition to diﬀerences in covariates and data sets)
the emissions intensity ratio is computed by industry, whereas we look at the aggregate emissions intensity
ratio.
285 Simulation Results
The goal of our numerical experiments is to quantitatively assess the eﬀects on pollution
emissions derived from changes in subsidies to SOEs required by China’s WTO accession
documents. The initial year for each simulation is 1997. China has been reforming its
economy at least since the early 1980s, to improve economic performance and comply with
trade rules and agreements. Since it is diﬃcult to assess the reasons behind subsidy reduction
decisions, we focus on subsidies speciﬁcally targeted for elimination in the US-China WTO
Bilateral Agreement (White House 1999). The agreement, signed in 1999, gives a timetable
for elimination of subsidies ranging from 0 to 15 years, depending on the good. We chose a
ﬁve year reform period (2000-04) since most goods have a ﬁve year timetable.
Although the policy changes are not fully implemented until 2004, in anticipation of the
new policies, households change decisions beginning in 1997. Changes in investment prior
to the reform period is especially complicated. For example, suppose households know the
interest subsidy rate and therefore the future return to capital are to fall. Therefore, the
return to current investment falls. However, the incentive to reduce current investment is
mitigated by the household’s desire for smooth consumption. Since households know future
wealth and consumption will fall, an incentive to reduce current consumption and increase
current investment exists. Since pollution is proportional to output, pollution also changes
in anticipation of the new policy in complicated ways. Our results therefore give caution
to static empirical work in this area, since pollution is likely to vary signiﬁcantly along the
dynamic path to the new balanced growth path.
In this paper, we consider ﬁve policy experiments. The ﬁrst experiment, which we denote
the benchmark economy, assumes the WTO agreement is not signed. Tariﬀs and interest
subsidy rates remain at their 1997 values. Direct subsidies were already in a downward
trend before the WTO agreement, as China was in a process of industrial reform. In the
benchmark economy we assume that direct subsidy rates continue in the same downward
trend during the reform period as in the pre-reform period, and stabilize afterward. In
the other four experiments, policies change over the reform period. Given China’s current
state of development, we assume the benchmark economy is not in a steady state in 1997.
Therefore, to isolate the eﬀects of the changes in subsidies, we present all results relative to
the benchmark economy.
The second experiment reduces direct subsidies, as required by the WTO. Subsidies to
be eliminated constitute about 0.35% of 1998 value added. In the model, this corresponds
to a reduction in direct subsidies of 26.1%. A reduction in subsidies of 26.1% requires
29reducing the labor requirement by about 20%. Since our calibrated world tariﬀs on Chinese
goods is only 5%, reductions in direct subsidies will have larger eﬀects than reductions in
tariﬀs because reductions in the labor requirement are larger than reductions in tariﬀs. To
facilitate comparing reductions in subsidies with reducing tariﬀs, we chose in the second
experiment to reduce direct subsidies by 7%, which is equivalent to a 6.5% reduction in the
labor requirement.27
The labor requirement reduction moves labor to the private sector, which increases the
marginal product of capital in the private sector. Therefore, capital also moves to the
private sector. Both of these eﬀects slightly raise the long run output level by 0.23%, above
the benchmark model. Since pollution is proportional to output, this scale eﬀect causes
pollution to rise. However, the private sector is less pollution intensive, so the movement of
labor and capital to the private sector results in a technique eﬀect which causes pollution
to fall. As shown in Table 4 and Figures 1-3, steady state pollution falls relative to the
benchmark for all three pollutants, from a decrease of 3.2% in soot to a 4.88% decrease
in dust. In the ﬁgures, the decrease in pollution at the end of the reform period (2004),
is the capital and labor reallocation eﬀects resulting from moving labor and capital to the
less pollution intensive sector. The resource reallocation eﬀect is in accordance with the
prediction of Theorem 3, since σG/σP > 1/(1 − s) = 2.44 for all three pollutants. Pollution
after 2004 is nearly ﬂat, so the capital accumulation eﬀect is small here. Overall, SOEs
are suﬃciently more pollution intensive in our calibrated model for the technique eﬀect to
outweigh the scale eﬀect.
The third experiment shows the eﬀect of a 2% reduction in the interest subsidy rate,
holding the reduction in direct subsidies during the reform period at benchmark levels.
Preventing SOE losses, and therefore direct subsidies, from increasing requires a 15.1%
reduction in the labor requirement over the reform period. Although interest subsidies are
not speciﬁcally marked for elimination, they might be reduced if another country brought
suit, or if (as promised) China opens its banking sector. The reduction in the subsidy
rate lowers the overall return to capital and causes existing capital to ﬂow to the private
sector. The resulting fall in investment lowers steady state output relative to the benchmark
economy. The steady state scale eﬀect therefore reduces pollution here. Production also
moves to the less pollution intensive private sector, further reducing pollution. Thus the
scale and technique eﬀects both result in a decrease in steady state pollution. Figures 1-3
show that most of the reduction in pollution occurs due to the initial resource reallocation
27Reducing the labor requirement by 20% causes reductions in steady state pollution of 10-15%, depending
on the pollutant, relative to the benchmark economy.
30eﬀect, and the capital accumulation eﬀect causes a small decrease in pollution after 2004. As
shown in Table 4, steady state emissions of all four pollutants fall relative to the benchmark,
from a 8.7% fall in soot to a 12.8% fall in dust.
The fourth experiment combines the two changes in policies. It shows the eﬀect of a
2% reduction in the interest subsidy rate, together with an additional 7% decrease in direct
subsidies in the reform period. The model requires a 23% reduction in the labor requirement
to keep SOE losses from increasing above 7%. As a result of the combined policy changes,
the fall in pollution is larger. Long run output increases, since lower return to capital caused
by lower subsidies is oﬀset by labor moving to the high productivity private sector, increasing
output. The reductions in pollution range from 12.5% for soot to 18.6% for dust.
The ﬁnal experiment analyzes the eﬀect of a pure tariﬀ reduction. In particular, we
eliminate the rest of the world’s tariﬀs against China. This causes an increase in demand
for Chinese goods and a corresponding increase in output. As shown in Table 4 and Figures
1-3, pollution rises over time as the higher demand for Chinese products increases the return
to capital and the economy grows. Pollution increases by 0.7% for all pollutants relative
to the benchmark. The reduction in tariﬀs does not favor private ﬁrms over SOEs, so no
technique eﬀect exists. Therefore, the eﬀect on pollution relative to benchmark is the same
for all pollutants.
The eﬀect of changes in tariﬀs on pollution is apparently quantitatively small relative
to the eﬀect of changes in subsidies. Since there is a relatively large diﬀerence in emissions
intensity between the state owned and private sectors, moving inputs from one sector to the
other has a quantitatively larger eﬀect on pollution emissions relative to the eﬀect of a change
in foreign demand. Furthermore, our model is not designed to capture any composition eﬀects
due to shifts of production between industries with diﬀerent pollution intensities.
Table 5 breaks down the change in pollution into scale and technique eﬀects for all
pollutants and all experiments. The scale eﬀect is positive for the reduction in direct subsidies
and the reduction in world tariﬀs. Notice the scale eﬀect is identical across pollutants in
percentage terms since output is independent of pollution. As noted earlier, the technique
eﬀect is stronger where the diﬀerence in pollution intensity is greatest, for industrial dust.
The reduction in tariﬀs does not aﬀect the fraction of output which is state owned, and
therefore no technique eﬀect exists after reducing tariﬀs.
316 Sensitivity Analysis and extensions
6.1 Emissions intensity uncertainty
In this section we perform sensitivity analysis on the diﬀerence between σG and σP, which
is determined from the coeﬃcient ˆ η1 from Section 4.2. In particular, we run again the
simulations in Section 5 changing ˆ η1 in two diﬀerent ways. First, we reduce ˆ η1 by one
standard deviation. Second, we use the values of ˆ η1 estimated in the regression model with
year speciﬁc eﬀects (model 4 in Tables 2-3).
In both cases we obtain that the qualitative results of Section 5 remain unchanged. Table
6 indicates the long run pollution intensity decreases for all pollutants in all experiments that
involve a reduction in SOE subsidies.28 When using model 4, the magnitude of the emissions
reduction is a bit smaller except for dust which is virtually unchanged since ˆ η1 is close in
models 3 and 4 for dust. A one standard deviation reduction in ˆ η1 reduces the magnitude
of the emissions reduction by 37-62% depending on the pollutant and experiment. The
largest reduction is for soot, the pollutant for which ˆ η1 had the most variance. Overall we
conclude that the qualitative results are robust to reasonable changes in the ratio of emissions
intensities. The eﬀect on the magnitude of the results is negligible to moderate, depending
on the pollutant and how ˆ η1 is changed.
6.2 The eﬀect of distortionary output taxes
In section 5, we assumed smaller government subsidies resulted in smaller lump sum taxes in
the government budget constraint. This isolates the eﬀect of subsidy reductions on emissions.
However, if instead the government used the revenue freed by reducing subsidies to reduce
distortionary output taxes, then the scale eﬀect would increase. With lower production taxes,
steady state output is above the level with lump sum taxes, and therefore pollution rises as
well. Here we quantify whether this additional scale eﬀect is enough to cause pollution to
rise following a reduction in subsidies.
The changes in subsidies are phased in, and the economy is on the transition path to the
steady state. Therefore, the governments ﬁscal position varies over the transition path. To
make the experiment straightforward, we set the production tax rate in all periods so that
the economy with less subsidies and lower production taxes converges to a steady state with
an identical transfer as the steady state of the benchmark economy.
28In the experiment where only tariﬀs are reduced, the results remain unchanged. This is not surprising,
given that in this experiment there is no technique eﬀect and, thus, changes in relative pollution have no
eﬀect in the economy.
32Results are in Table 6. The required reduction in production taxes are between 2.2 and
11.3%, depending on the experiment. Lower production taxes increase the scale eﬀect, and
so pollution reductions are lower, but only slightly so. Pollution falls by 1-4 percentage
points less, depending on the experiment. Reductions in both subsidies causes the largest
reduction in tax rates, and therefore the biggest diﬀerence in pollution reductions. Reducing
the tariﬀ rate now results in a 1.7% increase in pollution, more than double. Steady state
pollution still falls for all experiments, however. The qualitative results are therefore robust
to changes in how the government budget constraint is balanced.
6.3 Multiple sectors
The model has one sector and therefore no composition eﬀects. Here we consider a multiple
sector version of the model so as to contrast the size of the our technique eﬀect with composi-
tion eﬀects. We start with the computational model of section 5. Aggregate consumption is
a CES function of consumption of the output from the individual sectors. Let ǫj, j = 1...J,

















To match the input-output tables, we assume that the investment good is produced using
all other goods as inputs. We assume the investment production function is Cobb-Douglas,









All other assumptions are the same as in the one sector model.
For calibration, we now require data at the sectoral level on output, capital, subsidies,
etc., by ownership. These data are not available for services, construction, and agriculture.
For industrial sectors, the CSY reports output at the sector level by type of ownership, as
noted in section 4.2.1. Some capital data is also available by ownership, but many capital
categories include non-physical capital, or are valued at purchase prices or at a market value
that is not frequently updated. We follow Holz (2006), who recommends using the “original
value of ﬁxed assets” column as a proxy for physical capital. The key assumption is that
asset prices did not change much between the time of the last revaluation of ﬁxed assets and
1997 (about three years).
33The one-sector model is calibrated using data on subsidies to loss making SOEs. This
data is not available by industrial sector. An alternative is to calibrate the minimum labor
requirement using labor compensation data (data on employment by industry and ownership
is also not available). Tax and proﬁt data is also available. We therefore estimate total labor
compensation by ownership and sector as the diﬀerence between value added and taxes,
proﬁts, and depreciation. We then back out the labor supply by ownership and sector using
the industry wide average wage and total employment. SOE losses are not available by
sector, so losses cannot be used to calibrated the direct subsidies received by each sector.
Given the lack of losses data, we also assume in the experiments that subsidies are reduced
by an equal percentage amount in each sector.
We calibrate the Armington aggregator and preference parameters using the 1997 in-
put/output (I/O) tables in the CSY. The I/O tables aggregate 39 industrial sectors into 10,
so we also aggregate our production data to match the I/O data. We exclude the sector
foodstuﬀ (including food processing and manufacturing, beverages, and tobacco), since our
calibrated parameter values imply SOEs are more productive than private ﬁrms, which is
inconsistent the existence of both types ownership in equilibrium.29 This leaves nine usable
sectors: mining, textiles, other manufacturing, electric power/utilities, coking and petroleum
reﬁning, chemical industry, non-metal mineral products, metal products, and machinery and
equipment. The ten sector aggregation in the input output data is not ideal from an en-
vironmental perspective, as many industries with diﬀerent emissions proﬁles are grouped
together.
Table 7 gives the calibrated parameter values. The capital-weighted average interest
subsidy equal to 0.49 is reasonably close to our aggregate number of 0.59, indicating our
measure of state owned capital by sector is reasonable. Except for machinery and equipment,
the interest subsidy does not vary much across sectors. The most troublesome parameter is
the minimum labor requirement, which is higher in most industries than in the one sector
model. Our calibration strategy assumes SOEs and private ﬁrms pay identical wages and
then backs out employment from the labor compensation. Most likely, SOEs pay higher
wages, which would reduce the calibrated minimum labor requirement. Given the absence of
data on wages by ownership and sector, however, any diﬀerence in wages would be arbitrary.
Table 8 gives the change in the steady state variables after each experiment, relative to
the benchmark of no change in policy. The decrease in direct subsidies has a more mixed
29One possibility is that within the food sector private ﬁrms are too small to take advantage of economies
of scale. The larger SOEs then become more productive. Foodstuﬀ accounts for less than four percent of
emissions for each air pollutant.
34eﬀect across pollutants than in the one sector model. Steady state SO2 emissions rise by
3.6% relative to benchmark after an 6.5% decrease in the labor requirement. Soot emissions
rise by 4.9%, while dust falls by 8.8%. The change in results is less a function of composition
eﬀects as it is the alternative calibration method in which the economy starts out with very
high direct subsidies. When the direct subsidies are reduced, labor and capital move to the
private sector, increasing capital accumulation, steady state output, and therefore pollution.
That is, the scale eﬀect is much stronger.
Results are similar for the decrease in interest subsidies. When the interest subsidies are
accompanied by a decrease in the high labor requirement, a large amount of labor moves to
the private sector causing output and pollution to increase a scale eﬀect that outweighs the
lower emissions intensity in the private sector.
As with the one sector model, tariﬀ reductions have only small eﬀects on steady state
pollution. Reducing tariﬀs to zero causes an increase in pollution of only 1.03-1.28% above
benchmark depending on the pollutant. Therefore, our result from the one sector model that
changes in subsidies are quantitatively more important than changes in tariﬀs is robust to
the addition of multiple sectors.
Table 9, breaks down the change in pollution into scale, technique, and composition
eﬀects. The scale eﬀect is computed supposing in the experiment total output changes but
the fraction of state owned output is unchanged, as is the fraction of state owned output
produced by each industry, and the fraction of private output produced by each industry.
The scale eﬀect does not vary by pollutant and is in fact equal to the percentage change
in output. The decrease in direct subsidies causes a large scale eﬀect: pollution rises by
9.15% simply because steady state output rises. This eﬀect is primarily since the reduction
in the minimum labor requirement is larger than in the one sector model (the average labor
requirement is 73%, so an 6.5% reduction is large relative to the 6.5% of 40% requirement
in the one sector model). The scale eﬀect is also large relative to the one sector model for
the other experiments.
We calculate the technique eﬀect assuming total output in the experiment, the fraction of
state owned output produced by each industry, and the fraction of private output produced
by each industry are all held constant at the benchmark. Only the fraction of total output
that is state owned is allowed to change. Since lower subsidies reduce the fraction of state
owned output and SOEs are more emissions intensive, the technique eﬀect reduces pollution.
As in the one sector model, we see relatively large technique eﬀects for both the reduction
in direct and interest subsidies (5.6-43.5% decrease).
35The composition eﬀect is computed assuming total output and the fraction of total out-
put that is state owned are unchanged from the benchmark simulation. Only the fraction
of SOE output produced by each industry, and the share of private output produced by
each private industry is allowed to change.30 Table 9 indicates the composition eﬀect is the
smallest eﬀect in all experiments (3.6% decrease to 6.5% increase). Nonetheless, the com-
position eﬀect signiﬁcantly aﬀects the total change in pollution in some cases, for example
the change in SO2 caused by a reduction in direct subsidies. Steady state output rises in all
sectors relative to the benchmark following a decrease in direct subsidies. However, mining,
electric power, and machinery see the biggest increases, while textiles, coking, and metal
products see the smallest increases. From Table 7, mining, electricity, and machinery had
the largest labor requirements, so the total reduction in the labor requirement is largest
for these sectors. Sectoral reallocations of output were relatively small for the experiments
reducing interest subsidies and tariﬀs (no more than 3% above or 2% below the average
increase across sectors). Overall, then, the extension to multiple sectors indicates that the
composition eﬀect is relatively small, and that calibrating the labor requirement using the la-
bor compensation data results in a large increase in the labor requirement which signiﬁcantly
increases pollution in most cases.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the eﬀects of industrial subsidies and trade policy on the environ-
ment. We give theoretical conditions for which a reduction in subsidies to industry results in
a decrease in pollution. The conditions require the subsidized sector to be suﬃciently more
pollution intensive than the private sector. We argue SOEs or other ﬁrms receiving various
government subsidies are likely to also receive another kind of subsidy: lax enforcement of
pollution regulations. Indeed, for the case of China, after controlling for industry ﬁxed ef-
fects, SOEs are more signiﬁcantly more pollution intensive than private ﬁrms for three of
four pollutants studied. Furthermore, our numerical section shows that the reduction in di-
rect subsidies to Chinese SOEs required by WTO accession reduces pollution for SO2, soot,
and dust. We also show that changes in tariﬀs have a minimal eﬀect on pollution relative to
changes in subsidies.
Several caveats are in order. First, given that China’s state owned sector comprises about
30Note that it is impossible to fully isolate the composition eﬀect as holding the industry shares of total
output constant would aﬀect the share of industry which is state owned. Therefore, the three eﬀects do not
sum exactly to the total eﬀect.
3638% of industrial output, China represents an extreme case. Still, given the evidence weak
enforcement of environmental regulations on SOEs in countries like India and Indonesia, and
the prevalence of SOEs in developing countries, our analysis is very relevant for studying the
environmental eﬀects of trade agreements in developing countries. Further, given that nearly
all countries give some subsidies to industry, our model has some relevance for developed
economies as well. Second, subsidized ﬁrms in our model are price takers. Subsidized ﬁrms
may have monopoly powers and SOEs may suﬀer from agency issues. Each of these ﬁrm
structures may aﬀect pollution. For example, granting monopoly powers may cause SOEs
to reduce output and therefore pollution. If so, reducing subsidies may cause a larger scale
eﬀect than our model indicates. Nonetheless, for the case of China, SOE shares of value
added are reasonable,31 which supports the idea that SOEs and private ﬁrms compete in the
same industries at least for China.32 We assume subsidies are reduced by an equal percentage
across sectors. If subsidies are reduced unevenly, composition eﬀects may result. Finally, we
use the Armington aggregator speciﬁcation to capture intra-industry trade. It is well known
that AGE models using this speciﬁcation underestimate the magnitude of the increase in
trade following a reduction in tariﬀs, even though they predict quite well which sectors will
be most aﬀected.
The exogenous subsidies considered here are the outcome of the political process. Mod-
eling this process is a subject of future research. Regardless of the political process, a free
trade agreement, by creating new winners and losers, has the possibility of altering the po-
litical equilibrium. A trade agreement may potentially reduce pollution-causing subsidies in
a way that a privatization may not. If the political equilibrium is unchanged, privatization
is unlikely to produce signiﬁcant changes.
In this paper we have found a new channel for which economic policy aﬀects pollution, a
technique eﬀect that results when production moves from a more pollution intensive subsi-
dized ﬁrm to a less pollution intensive private ﬁrm. This technique eﬀect could be examined
in many other contexts. For example, countries with low subsides are both richer and have
a cleaner environment, thus our model would likely reproduce the environmental Kuznets
curve. Our model could also be used to examine the eﬀects of privatization on pollution.
31The maximum in 1997 is 82%, and only two of 17 industries have over 80% SOE shares. Twelve of 17
industries have shares less than 50%.
32However, subsidies, tariﬀs, output taxes, etc. cause the results to diﬀer from the standard competitive
equilibrium. We are ignoring some other policies which cause deviations from the competitive equilibrium,
such as other subsidies and price controls (Young (2000) views price controls as inter-regional tariﬀs, which
we do not consider since our model is not disaggregated by region). Price controls speciﬁc to SOEs could be
implemented, but we lack price data by ownership.
37These are subjects of future research.
8 Appendix: Proof of theorems
8.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Substituting the interest rate (2.2), wage rate (2.3), and transfer (2.20) into the budget
constraint for the aggregate good (3.7) and simplifying results in:
c + k
′ = G (k,K;s), (8.1)





ΩAPFk (K − KG (K;s),1 − lG)
Y (K;s)
1−φ (k − K) +
(1 − δ)k, (8.2)
Y (K;s) ≡ APF (K − KG (K;s),1 − lG) + AGF (KG (K;s),lG). (8.3)
The model is now in the framework of Greenwood and Huﬀman (1995) (GH). Using the
condition given in the theorem and repeatedly appealing to (2.9), and the properties of the
interest rate and the share of capital in the subsidized sector (conditions 2.6 and 2.7), we
can verify assumptions (i)-(iii) of GH. It follow from their proposition on page 615 that an
equilibrium exists.
Further, equation (3) of GH states that the equilibrium investment function H is the
ﬁxed point a recursive non-linear functional equation. The ﬁxed point of this equation is the
Euler equation. Hence H satisﬁes the Euler equation.
Equation (4) of GH states that H has the following properties:
0 ≤ HK (K) ≤ G1 (K,K) + G2 (K,K), (8.4)
0 < H (K) < G (K,K). (8.5)
Equation (8.4) implies that c(K) is increasing in K. Thus since u is concave, for all K,
K′:
(uc (c(K)) − uc (c(K
′)))(K − K
′) ≤ 0. (8.6)
Substituting in the Euler equation, we see that K′ > K if and only if K < ¯ K. Thus H is
38concave. Thus H has the properties stated in Theorem 1.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 2
As shown in the text, condition (3.17) implies a decrease in the subsidy decreases pollution.
For the steady state, let β =
1
1+λ, where λ is the rate of time preference. Evaluating



























is decreasing in ¯ K, the right hand side is
decreasing in ¯ K. Hence a decrease in the subsidy implies a decrease in ¯ K. It is straightfor-
ward, but tedious, to use the implicit function theorem on (8.7) to verify
∂ ¯ E
∂s > 0 if and only
if condition (3.18) holds.
For periods between 0 and the steady state, note that from Theorem 1, H (K) is strictly
increasing and concave in K. Hence, K will converge monotonically to ¯ ¯ K from above, since
K0 > ¯ ¯ K. Given that pollution is increasing in the capital stock, pollution will also converge
monotonically from above to ¯ ¯ E.
8.3 Proof of Theorem 3
First, given Ap (1 − s) < AG, equation (2.5) implies:
FK (KP,lP) > FK (KG,lG). (8.8)
Because F is concave and has constant returns to scale, equation (8.8) implies the government




lG ). Thus, since FK/Fl is a decreasing function of







and thus the ratio of emissions intensities is larger than the wage ratio.
Diﬀerentiating pollution with respect to lG, holding K ﬁxed, we see that current pollution
falls given conditions (3.17) and (8.9). In addition, diﬀerentiating the steady state pollution
with respect to lG implies that steady state pollution falls given condition (3.21) holds.
39Let E0 < ¯ E denote the new pollution emissions in the initial period. For periods between
0 and the steady state, steady state capital also falls given Ap (1 − s) < AG, so pollution will
decline to the new steady state ¯ ¯ E < E0. The reasoning is identical to Theorem 2.
8.4 Proof of Theorem 4
















¯ Y 1−φ. (8.11)
It is then immediate that the derivatives of the terms of trade with respect to the subsidies
moves inversely to the derivative of steady state output with respect to subsidies. As shown
in theorem 2, steady state output is increasing in the interest subsidy. Thus, the steady
state terms of trade is decreasing in the interest subsidy. Finally, it is straightforward to
show that steady state output is decreasing in the direct subsidy, and thus terms of trade
are increasing in the direct subsidy, if and only if condition (2.8) holds.
8.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Current pollution is a function of only the current capital stock, tax rates, and lG, all of
which are given. Hence current pollution is independent of Ω. For the steady state, note
that modiﬁed golden rule (8.7) for this economy implies that if Ω rises then so does steady
state capital. Since steady state pollution is increasing in the steady state capital stock for
σG > σP, steady state pollution rises.
For periods between 0 and the steady state, capital and pollution will increase monoton-
ically to the new steady state, using identical reasoning as in Theorem 2.
9 Appendix: Tables and Figures
40Parameter Symbol Value Source
Production Parameters
Capital Share α 0.43 (a)
Productivity, Private Sector AP 1.62 (a)
Productivity, SOEs AG 1.04 (a)
Growth rate, productivity γ 1.02 US trend
Armington Aggregator
Technology Parameter Z 1.92 Equilibrium
Elasticity Parameter ζ 0.50 AGE literature
Share Parameter   0.61 I/O, Equilibrium
Investment Parameters
Depreciation δ 0.08 Investment Data
Preference Parameters
Discount Rate β 0.96 one-year period
Elasticity Parameter χ 0.00 within RBC range
Foreign Demand ˆ D 0.45 I/O
Population Growth n 1.01 Demographic data
Policy Parameters
Production Tax t 0.38 (a)
Government Consumption G 0 I/O
Rental rate subsidy s 0.59 (a)
Initial SOE labor share lG/l 0.40 (a)
World tariﬀ τD 0.02 Tiwari, et. al. (2002)
Domestic tariﬀ τF 0.05 Tiwari, et. al. (2002)
Initial Values
Initial Labor L 3.7 I/O.
Initial Capital K0 2 Penn Tables
Table 1: Economic parameter values. (a): Jointly calibrated to match the SOE shares of
capital and labor for 1997, the SOE losses as a percentage of GDP in 1997, capital and labor
income from the I/O (input-output) table, and domestic output for 1997. Units of K0 and
L are normalized as a fraction of 1997 value added (0.76 10 trillion yuan).
41For Tables 2-3, models are (1) OLS, (2) industry ﬁxed eﬀects, (3) industry ﬁxed eﬀects
with time trend, and (4) industry ﬁxed eﬀects with year speciﬁc eﬀects. T-statistics calcu-
lated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity are below the coeﬃcients, and
an asterisk indicates signiﬁcance at the 95% level.
SO2 Soot
Econometric Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant -0.16 -0.03
(-1.60) (-.63)
σG − σP = η1 3.57* 2.23* 1.42* 1.23* 1.82* 1.29* 0.66 0.49
(3.22) (9.30) (2.73) (2.41) (2.86) (7.09) (1.84) (1.43)
η2 -2.05* -1.22* -1.00* -1.74* -1.18* -0.64* -0.47 -1.05*
(-1.99) (-3.90) (2.70) (-2.94) (-2.01) (-2.69) (-1.70) (-2.34)
η1 + η2 1.52* 1.02* 0.43 -0.50 0.64* 0.65* 0.19 -0.56
(3.99) (3.50) (1.16) (-0.87) (3.95) (2.72) (0.70) (-1.32)
Implied σG 2.92 2.21 1.78 1.68 1.52 1.24 0.90 0.81
Implied σP -0.65 -0.02 0.36 0.44 -0.30 -0.05 0.24 0.32
Time trend -0.02 -0.02*
(-1.85) (-2.05)
1995 Time Dummy 0.09 0.14
(0.51) (1.01)
1996 Time Dummy -0.04 -0.00
(-0.24) (-0.01)
1999 Time Dummy 0.44 0.41
(1.76) (1.80)
2000 Time Dummy 0.39 0.31
(1.66) (1.58)
2001 Time Dummy 0.29 0.27
(1.36) (1.56)
2002 Time Dummy 0.21 0.21
(1.06) (1.32)
2003 Time Dummy 0.11 0.13
(0.58) (0.87)
2005 Time Dummy 0.01 0.04
(0.04) (0.33)
2006 Time Dummy -0.05 -0.01
(-0.29) (-0.04)
2007 Time Dummy -0.11 -0.05
(-0.60) (-0.33)
R2 0.186 0.941 0.942 0.945 0.169 0.864 0.865 0.872
Adjusted R2 0.207 0.944 0.945 0.945 0.187 0.857 0.859 0.859
Table 2: Regression coeﬃcients and results for SO2 and soot, 296 observations. Units for
pollution intensity coeﬃcients (σ and η) are tons per hundred thousand 1990 yuan.
42Industrial Dust COD
Econometric Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.27* 0.45*
(2.97) (3.57)
σG − σP = η1 0.40 2.14* 1.66* 1.68* 1.66 3.60* 1.28 1.46
(1.66) (3.73) (2.95) (3.05) (1.66) (2.83) (1.04) (1.27)
η2 -0.45 -0.29 -0.16 -0.60 -1.23 -1.08* -0.45 0.73
(-1.67) (-1.82) (-0.95) (-1.76) (-1.97) (-2.49) (-1.10) (1.07)
η1 + η2 -0.06 1.85* 1.50* 1.08* -0.39* 2.52* 0.83 2.19
(-0.50) (2.97) (2.46) (2.58) (-2.13) (2.64) (0.89) (1.58)
Implied σG 1.18 2.11 1.85 1.86 1.01 2.48 1.25 1.34
Implied σP 0.79 -0.03 0.20 0.19 0.17 -1.12 -0.03 -0.12
Time trend -0.01 -0.07*
(-0.91) (-2.51)
1995 Time Dummy -0.21 0.12
(-1.34) (0.17)
1996 Time Dummy -0.26 -0.20
(-1.72) (-0.38)
1999 Time Dummy 0.30 -0.83
(0.59) (-1.13)
2000 Time Dummy 0.12 -0.90
(0.35) (-1.28)
2001 Time Dummy -0.20 -1.21
(-0.89) (-1.75)
2002 Time Dummy -0.20 -1.22
(-0.90) (-1.77)
2003 Time Dummy -0.24 -1.19
(-1.04) (-1.76)
2005 Time Dummy -0.21 -1.09
(-0.87) (-1.65)
2006 Time Dummy -0.23 -1.08
(-0.90) (-1.64)
2007 Time Dummy -0.24 -1.07
(-0.88) (-1.62)
R2 0.013 0.780 0.780 0.790 0.029 0.666 0.672 0.681
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.738 0.738 0.748 0.022 0.672 0.631 0.643
Table 3: Regression coeﬃcients and results for industrial dust and COD, 296 observations.
Units for pollution intensity coeﬃcients (σ and η) are tons per hundred thousand 1990 yuan.
43Steady State as a Percent of Baseline
Experiment Y SO2 Soot Dust
Decrease S by 7% 0.23 -3.81 -3.21 -4.88
Decrease s by 2% -0.11 -10.17 -8.67 -12.83
Decrease s 2%, S 7% 0.23 -14.67 -12.45 -18.62
Decrease τF to 0 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
Table 4: Steady state results of numerical experiments. Percent change relative to the
benchmark economy.
Steady State Scale and Technique Ef-
fects
Scale Eﬀect Technique Eﬀects
Experiment All Pollutants SO2 Soot Dust
Decrease S by 7% 0.23 -4.03 -3.43 -5.09
Decrease s by 2% -0.11 -10.07 -8.57 -12.74
Decrease s 2%, S 7% 0.23 -14.86 -12.65 -18.80
Decrease τF to 0 0.70 0 0 0
Table 5: Results of numerical experiments: steady state scale and technique eﬀects. Percent
change relative to the benchmark economy.
Steady State as a Percent of Baseline
ˆ η1 Reduced by one standard deviation
Experiment SO2 Soot Dust
Decrease S by 7% -2.21 -1.23 -2.97
Decrease s by 2% -6.19 -3.75 -8.08
Decrease s 2%, S 7% -8.77 -5.17 -11.58
Decrease τF to 0 0.7 0.7 0.7
ˆ η1 From regression with year speciﬁc eﬀects
Experiment SO2 Soot Dust
Decrease S by 7% -3.25 -2.24 -4.95
Decrease s by 2% -8.77 -6.27 -13.03
Decrease s 2%, S 7% -12.61 -8.89 -18.90
Decrease τF to 0 0.7 0.7 0.7
Reduce production taxes, keep lump sum taxes constant
Experiment SO2 Soot Dust
Decrease S by 7% , t by 2.8% -2.65 -2.04 -3.73
Decrease s by 2% t by 7.6% -7.25 -5.71 -10.0
Decrease s 2%, S 7%, t by 11.2% -10.59 -8.27 -14.73
Decrease τF to 0, t by 2.3% 1.69 1.69 1.69




n Demographic data. 1.01
γ Kehoe and Prescott
(2002)
1.02
δ Bajona and Chu
(2010)
0.08
ρ within RBC range -1
χ Given. 0
β One year period. 0.96
L CSY. 5.66
AI Equation (6.2) 7.53
Sector speciﬁc parameters
Sym. Source/Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
α Equation (2.3). 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.57 0.32 0.27 0.36 0.20 0.78
AP Production function. 1.10 0.42 0.44 1.26 0.77 0.55 0.80 0.61 0.31
AG Production function. 0.24 0.09 0.10 0.33 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.15 0.22
ζ AGE literature. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
M I/O tables. 1.78 1.83 1.75 1.96 1.96 1.38 1.92 1.98 1.02
  I/O tables. 0.68 0.65 0.69 0.57 0.58 0.83 0.60 0.54 0.99
D I/O tables. 0.43 4.28 1.53 0.20 1.68 0.33 1.26 4.29 0.04
ζF AGE Literature. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
ν I/O tables. 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.18 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.04
ǫ I/O tables. 0.59 0 0 0.30 0 0.02 0.06 0 0.03
lG/L Labor compensation. 0.96 0.55 0.51 0.96 0.77 0.66 0.87 0.68 0.92
s capital/output ratios. 0.69 0.60 0.59 0.62 0.59 0.55 0.61 0.55 0.05
t Production data. 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.23
g I/O tables. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
τD Tiwari, et. al. (2002) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
τF Tiwari, et. al. (2002) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table 7: Calibration of the model with multiple sectors. For parameters where the source is
an equation, it indicates the parameter is calibrated to satisfy the given equation. CSY is
the China Statistical Yearbook. Sectors are (1) mining and quarrying, (2) textiles, sewing,
leather and fur products, (3) other manufacturing, (4) production and supply of electric
power, steam, and hot water, (5) coking, gas, and petroleum reﬁning, (6) chemical industry,
(7) building materials and non-metal mineral products, (8) metal products, and (9) machin-
ery and equipment. Parameters with monetary units are in trillion yuan and L has units of
10 million workers.
45Steady State as Percentage above
Baseline
Experiment Y SO2 soot dust
Decrease lG by 6.5% 9.15 3.60 4.89 -8.79
Decrease s by 2% 21.06 8.06 11.12 -21.32
Both 32.09 12.47 17.08 -31.39
Decrease τF to 0 0.71 1.28 1.09 1.03
Table 8: Sensitivity analysis: Results of model with multiple sectors. Percent change relative
to the benchmark economy.
Scale Eﬀect
Steady State as Percentage
above Baseline
Experiment SO2 soot dust
Decrease lG by 6.5% 9.15 9.15 9.15
Decrease s by 2% 21.06 21.06 21.06
Both 32.09 32.09 32.09
Decrease τF to 0 0.71 0.71 0.71
Technique Eﬀect
Steady State as Percentage
above Baseline
Experiment SO2 soot dust
Decrease lG by 6.5% -7.92 -5.60 -14.91
Decrease s by 2% -16.82 -11.87 -31.63
Both -23.11 -16.32 -43.47
Decrease τF to 0 0.16 0.11 0.29
Composition Eﬀect
Steady State as Percentage
above Baseline
Experiment SO2 soot dust
Decrease lG by 6.5% 2.61 1.55 -1.41
Decrease s by 2% 5.15 3.07 -2.83
Both 6.54 3.87 -3.63
Decrease τF to 0 0.41 0.27 0.03
Table 9: Multiple sectors: scale, technique, and composition eﬀects. Percent change relative
to the benchmark economy.









































Figure 1: Sulfur Dioxide Emissions. Percent change relative to the benchmark economy.
Changes in tariﬀs and subsidies are phased in over years 2000-2004.







































Figure 2: Soot Emissions. Percent change relative to the benchmark economy. Changes in
tariﬀs and subsidies are phased in over years 2000-2004.










































Figure 3: Industrial dust emissions. Percent change relative to the benchmark economy.
Changes in tariﬀs and subsidies are phased in over years 2000-2004.
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